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importance. However, the mention of such a factor is consistent with
the view that, in looking at the application of a "neutral" state law,
the Court would not inflexibly assume that federal policy does not
preempt t ► e•state action.
CONCLUSION
Kearney has left open the question whether the Court will subse-
quently overrule the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB" approach to
preemption. For the present, state courts probably will continue to
apply the primary jurisdiction approach because the Supreme Court
has given them no express directive to the contrary; because the ap-
proach usually yields "correct" results;' 23 and because the courts are
accustomed to applying that approach. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Kearney rationale has put in question the doctrinal vitality of the
Gannon primary jurisdiction inquiry. More generally, the Court has
resolved the doubt left by Briggs as to the scope of the federally struck
labor balance, and has indicated in effect that the federal balance in-
cludes all peaceful self-help which is not clearly peripheral to the con-
cerns of the NLRA. In overruling Briggs the Court has expressly ap-
plied to preemption the comprehensive view of the federal labor
scheme which was implicit in past "permitted activities" preemption
cases.
MITCHELL S. PRESSMAN
Labor Law—Boys Markets Injunction—Sympathy Strike—Ac-
commodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act—Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steelworkers.'
The United Steelworkers of America (the Union) and two of its
locals were certified to represent office and clerical-technical em-
ployees in negotiating their first collective bargaining agreement with
the Buffalo Forge Company. When negotiations broke down, these
employees struck the company and established picket lines at three
separate plant and office facilities in the Buffalo, New York area. 2
Two days later the production and maintenance employees, also rep-
resented by the United Steelworkers, refused to cross the office em-
ployees' picket lines at one of the company's plants.a Shortly thereafter,
' 53.,See Cox. Labor Law Preemption Revisited, t15 MARV. L. REV. 1337, 1359 (1972).
By "correct" results are meant results consistent with the view that the states may not
regulate labor so as to disrupt the federally struck labor balance.
1 — U.S._, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
I Id. at 3143-44.
3 Id. at 3144. Throughout this note the terms refusal to cross a picket line, sym-
pathy strike; and honoring a sister union's picket line will be used interchangeably. A
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and pursuant to the Union's direction, production and maintenance
employees at the other two plants similarly refused to cross the picket
lines.
When the strike continued, the company sought a preliminary
injunction in United States district court pursuant to section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 4 claiming that the
strike resulted from a dispute over truck driving assignments and
should be arbitrated under the collective bargaining agreement's
mandatory grievance procedure. 5 Alternatively, the company claimed
that the work stoppages were sympathy strikes, and as such, violated
the agreement's "no-strike" clause." The district court found that the
sympathy strike may be defined as a work stoppage solely in deference to another
union's picket line. Sze NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U,S. 71, 81 (1953)
(dissenting opinion),
It has been recognized that employees have the right to participate in sympathy
strike activity. NLRB v. Difco Labs, Inc., 427 F.2d 170, 171-72, 74 L.R.R.M. 2273, 2274
(6th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, lnc., 426 F.2d 1299, 1301, 74
L.R.R.M. 2080, 2082 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc. 338
F.2(1 833, 836, 57 L.R.R.M. 2442, 2444 (9th Cir. 1964). However, that right can be
waived in lieu of other benefits. See note 142 infra.
4 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1970). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard tope citi-
zenship of the parties,
5 96 S. Ct. at 3144. The clause outlining the mandatory grievance procedure
provides:
Should diflerences arise between the [employed- and any employee cov-
ered by this Agreement as to the meaning and application of the provi-
sions of this Agreement, or should any trouble of any kind arise in the
plant, there shall he no suspension of work on account of such differences,
but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences immediately
[under the six step grievance and arbitration procedure provided in sec-
tions 27 through 32.]
Id. at 3143-44.
° Id. at 3144. The no-strike clause provides:
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of
work. No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, insti-
gate, aid or condone any such activities. No employee shall participate in
any such activity. The Union recognizes its possible liabilities for violation
of this provision and will use its influence to see that work stoppages are
prevented. Unsuccessful efforts by Union officers or Union representatives
to prevent and terminate conduct prohibited by this paragraph, will not he
construed as 'aid' or 'condonation' of such conduct and shall not result in
any disciplinary actions against the Officers, committeemen or stewards in-
volved.
Id. at 3143 n.l.
It should he noted at the outset that though there seem to be no qualifications
to this general no-strike clause, it has been recognized that a general no-strike clause
does not necessarily cover strikes over unfair labor practices, Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83 (1956), or strikes over safety disputes, 29 U.S.C. § 143
(1970); cf. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974), There-
fore, it is possible that a broad no-strike clause does not implicitly bar sympathy strikes.
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activity was not a protest over truck driving assignments, but rather
was a sympathy strike in support of the office and clerical-technical
employees.' As such, the court concluded that "there [was] no arbitra-
ble grievance between the parties" and consequently, that the sym-
pathy strike situation was not within the narrow exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Acts marked out by the Supreme Court in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union." Thus, perceiving itself to be
bound by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the district court determined
that it lacked the power to issue an injunction. On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed." The court of appeals held that the anti-injunction
policies of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" should be given ef-
7
 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Stipp. 405, 408-09, 88
L.R.R.M. 2063, 2065-66 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
"Id. at 409, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2066.
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 el seq. (1970). The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted in 1932
and was essentially designed to prohibit the federal judiciary from issuing injunctions in
a broad range of labor activity. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). In those areas where injunctions
are not prohibited, the Act provides that strict procedural requirements be followed be-
fore an injunction can lawfully issue. 29 U.S.G. § 107 (1970).
1 " 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Boys Markets the Supreme Court found that injunctive
relief was necessary to effectuate the pro-arbitration policies of § 301 of the 1.MRA,
notwithstanding the strict anti-injunction provisions of the Norris La-Guardia Act. See
text at notes 45-62 infra for discussion of Boys Markets. See text at notes 22-26 iirfrar for
discussion of the Norris LaGuardia Act.
" Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211, 89 L.R.R.M.
2303, 2306 (2d Cir. 1975). The production and maintenance employees had returned
to work on the next regular work day after the district court's decision. The court of
appeals held, however, that this did not render the case moot since "the work stoppage
under review may 'be resumed at any time in the near future.'" Id. at 1210, 89
L. R.R.M. at 2305 quoting joint afipendix at 2a. The Supreme Court agreed. 96 S. Ct. at
3145 n.8.
' 2
 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides:
No court of the United Stales shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any re-
lation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other
method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of
the acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud
or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertak-
ing or promise as is described in section 103 of this title.
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feet where no disservice was done to the pro-arbitration policies of
section 301(a) of the LM RA. 13
The Supreme Court affirmed," and in a 5-4 decision, HELD: In
sympathy strike situations there is no necessity to accommodate the
anti-injunction policies of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" to the pro-
arbitration policies of section 301 of the LMRA." Thus, the district
court had correctly determined that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohib-
ited the issuance of an injunction in this situation." The Court
reasoned that in Boys Markets, the justification for accommodating the
anti-injunction provision of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
the pro-arbitration policies of the LMRA was to give effect to the
congressional preference favoring private settlement of disputes
through arbitration. This was to be accomplished by allowing injunc-
tions to issue despite the anti-injunction provisions of Norris where a
strike frustrated the arbitral process." The Court suggested, however,
that since a sympathy strike is not a strike over an arbitral grievance
and has neither the purpose nor the effect of frustrating the arbitral
process, the Buffalo Forge case was not controlled by Boys- Markets."
Literally interpreted, the Norris-LaGuardia Act would seem to
prohibit an injunction From issuing in a sympathy strike situation. 2 °
However, the judiciary has long recognized that this Act does not.
exist in a vacuum and must co-exist with other legislative labor
enactments. 2 ' Accordingly, the courts have sought to strike a balance
between apparently conflicting statutory policies without disregarding
the core purpose of either statute through the process of accommoda-
tion. This note will focus on the process of accommodation as it re-
lates to the Buffalo Forge sympathy strike situation. The discussion will
initially review the Court's landmark accommodation in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Uttion. The manner in which the majority and dis-
sent applied the Boys Markets accommodation to the Buffalo Forge facts
will then be examined. Finally, this note will propose a possible basis
for accommodating the Norris-La Guardia Act to the scheme of
statutory labor policies to justify the issuance of' an injunction in a
sympathy strike situation, albeit in limited circumstances. Although
the Court accurately concluded that the Boys Markets principles were
'" Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211, 89 L.R.R.M.
2303, 2306 (2d Cir. 1975).
96 S. Ct. 3141. 3150 (1976).
0 See text and notes at notes 22-26 infra.
15 The pro-arbitration policies of the LMRA arc evidenced in various sections of
the Act. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) ("the settlement of issues between employers and
employees ... may be advanced by making available full and adequate governmental
facilities for ... voluntary arbitration....")
37 96 S. Ct. at 3149.
"id. at 3147.
,rd,
See text of § 4 of the. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104(a), at note 12
supra.
	
See text and notes at tunes 102-12 infra.
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inapposite in a Buffalo Forge situation, it will be submitted that this
conclusion was based on an unnecessarily narrow view of the accom-
modation process. It will be demonstrated that the accommodation
process need not be undertaken solely in furtherance of arbitration;
rather, the process, if broadly conceived, can accomplish other labor
objectives embodied in various congressional enactments, while retain-
ing the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in those situations for
which it was originally intended.
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BOYS MARKETS
The Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) were instrumental in giving unions the assistance necessary to
organize and bargain collectively. For example, prior to Norris, the
federal district court's broad use of the injunctive power severely re-
stricted the use of the strike weapon by unions in their organizing
efforts. 22 The Norris-LaGuardia Act curtailed this judicial abuse of
the' injunctive power by withdrawing from the federal courts the
power to issue injunctions in most labor disputes." These anti-
injunction policies, 24 buttressed by the affirmative rights to organize
and bargain collectively embodied in the NLRA," gave unions the
statutory assistance they needed to grow and mature. 26 While the
statutory assistance had certain positive effects, not the least of which
was the growth of unionism and the spread of collective bargaining, it
also gave rise to certain negative consequences. For example, under
the statutory scheme, unions found that they could breach collective
bargaining agreements with relative impunity. Thus, an employer
seeking to enforce a collective bargaining agreement in federal court
faced difficulties in meeting the amount in controversy or the diver-
sity of citizenship jurisdictional requirements. 27 Employer enforce-
22 J. Axelrod, The Application Of the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16
B.C. INn, & Cont. L. REV. 893, 895 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Axelrod].
"See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 250; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,
236 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers' Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311
U.S. 91, 102 (1940). See generally, F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
Section 4 of Norris enumerates a number of situations in which the federal
courts are specifically prohibited from issuing injunctions in "any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See note 12 supra for the
specific prohibitions relevant to this note.
" See the Declaration of Purpose to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 102
(1970).
2' 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See generally, R. GoitstAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw
4-5 (1976).
26 Axelrod, supra note 22, at 896. For example, front 1935 to 1947 union mem-
bership grew from 3 million to 15 million. A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAW 105 (7th Ed.
1969).
"See A. Cox. D. BoK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 646 (8th Ed. 1977); S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 423 (1948). For example, unions abused
their newfound power by, among other things, calling strikes that threatened injury to
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ment of the collective bargaining agreement was equally difficult in
state courts because of "rules of local law which made suits against
labor organizations difficult or impossible, by reason of their status as
unincorporated associations."28 By contrast, unions had little difficulty
calling an employer to task for virtually any breach of the collective
bargaining agreement."
Congress resolved these inequities by enacting the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947." Whereas the NLRA as enacted in
1935 focused mainly on the problem of employer interference with
union organizational activity, the LM RA emphasized the collective
bargaining phase of industrial relations. Thus, section 301(a) of this
Act allowed suits for violation of the collective bargaining agreement
to be brought. in the federal district court without regard to diversity
of citizenship or amount in controversy." While the courts readily as-
certained that section 301(a) granted employers a basis for obtaining
damages where the union was found to have violated the collective
bargaining agreement," the question of what impact, if any, the
enactment of section 301(a) had on the anti-injunction mandates of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not so easily resolved. 33
the public health and safety and engaging in secondary boycotts that could severely de-
bilitate a given industry. CON Sc BOK, supra note 26, at 107-08. See 93 CONG. REC. at
7690 (1947)(remarks of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEcist.ATIvE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1652-56 (1948).
aK Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510 (1962). For further dis-
cussion of the problem of suing unions in state courts, see Keene, The Supreme Court,
Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REv.
32, 33.34 (1969). See generally, Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MiGH,L.
REv. 673 (1961).
Keene, supra note 28, at 34.
29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
3 ' 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See note 4 supra for text of § 301(a).
'E .g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-58 (1957). The
Court in Textile Workers recognized that a possible construction of § 301(a) was that it
was merely a grant of jurisdiction over labor unions. Id. at 450-51. However the Court
stated that it seemed "clear . , . that Congress adopted a policy which placed sanctions
behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes," id. at 456, and, therefore, § 301 al-
lowed the federal court to fashion substantive law and grant damages for breaches of
collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 456, 459. The significant legislative history of §
301 is contained in an appendix to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Textile Workers,
353 U.S. at 985-596.
33 There was division among the circuit court of appeals as to whether § 301 im-
plicitly granted federal courts the power to enjoin strikes in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement. The First, Second and Seventh Circuits held that § 301 did not
affect the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on injunctive relief. W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters Local 25, 217 F.2d 6, 10, 35 L.R.R.M. 2148, 2151 (1st Cir.
1954); A.H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarers' Intl Union, 250 F.2d 326, 332, 41
L.R.R.M. 2121, 2126 (2d Cir. 1957); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312,
320, 48 L.R.R.M. 2045, 2052 (7th Cir. 1961), alp 370 U.S. 195 (1962). The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, held that an injunction could issue under § 301 to enjoin a strike in vio-
lation of the collective bargaining agreement, notwithstanding the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 795 v. Yellow Trans. Frgt. Lines, 282 F.2d
395, 349-50, 46 L.R.R.M. 2915, 2918 (10th Cir. 1960).
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Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson"' marked the Supreme Court's ini- '
tial confrontation with the question of whether section 301(a) im-
plicitly granted federal district courts the power to issue injunctions
for violations of collective bargaining agreements notwithstanding the
anti-injunction provisions of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."
In Sinclair the employer sued to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement, claiming that since the union had engaged in nine separate
work stoppages over disputes that, according to the contract, should
have been submitted to the grievance procedure, his contractual rights
against further deliberate violations of the no-strike clause could only
be protected by the issuance of an injunction." The Supreme Court
rejected these contentions and held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
expressly prohibited injunctions against this type of strike activity, re-
gardless of whether the activity was a breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement remediable under section 301. 37 The Court based its
holding on the conclusion that there was no real conflict between the
LMRA's protection of the collective bargaining agreement and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition of injunctions. First, the Court
noted that some provisions of the LMRA explicitly amended or re-
pealed other provisions of both the National Labor Relations Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act." If Congress had intended section 301 to
alter the anti-injunction provisions of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act then it certainly seems likely that it would have made
its intent known in the same express manner." 39 Second, the Court
pointed to legislative history of the LMRA which revealed that Con-
gress had considered whether to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
the extent of allowing injunctions for breaches of collective bargaining
agreements and had decided against it. 4° It seems, therefore, that the
34
 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
35
 The Court had previously held that Congress had not limited § 301 to damage
suits but had additionally granted federal courts the power to issue injunctions specifi-
cally enfbrcing an agreement to arbitrate even though a literal reading of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act might prohibit it. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
458-59, The Court held that the "failure to arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the
abuses against which the Act was aimed." Id. at 458.
" Id. at 197-98. The district court had dismissed Sinclair's complaint holding that
the dispute between Sinclair and the union was a "labor dispute" and as such jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions had been withdrawn by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act; the
court of appeals affirmed for the same reason. Id. at 198.
"Id. at 213-14. The Court stated that issuing an injunction against this strike ac-
tivity would run counter to §§ 4(a),(e),(i) of- the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at 212. See
note 12 supra for text of these sections.
3" Id. at 204-05. Section 101 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), amended § 10(h)
of the NLRA and § 208(b) of the Taft Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 178(b), by permitting
injunctions to he obtained by the NLRB and the Attorney General. Section 302(e), 29
U.S.C. § 186(e), amended the Norris-LaGuardia Act by permitting private litigants to
obtain injunctions to protect the integrity of the employees' collective bargaining rep-
resentatives in carrying out their responsibilities; and § 301(e) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(e), repealed § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106.
3 ' 370 U.S. at 204.
"Id. at 205. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, recognized the merits of
allowing injunctions to issue in breaches of collective bargaining agreements. He agreed
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majority in Sinclair was content to give a rigidly literal reading to sec-
tion 301 and the legislative history of the LMRA and thereby leave in-
tact the broad proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court
simply refused to resolve the conflict between the LMRA's vigorous
encouragement of the use of arbitration and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act's prohibition of the one remedy necessary to give full effect to this
process. The Court opted instead to let Congress clarify the meaning
of section 301, possibly concluding that such a reconciliation of un-
derlying policies of statutes was not an appropriate judicial function
when it was directly contrary to the plain words of the statute.
Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissent, 4 ' argued that since na-
tional labor policy clearly encouraged arbitration as the preferred
method of settling labor disputes, the anti-injunction provisions of
Norris should be accommodated and injunctive relief should be avail-
able against strikes over disputes that the union had promised to
arbitrate. 42 Brennan stated that this result would be consistent with
previous holdings43 that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not bar injunc-
tive relief when it conflicted with labor policies embodied in subse-
quent. Acts."
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union' gave the Court an oppor-
with the company that § 301 "would be worth more to (employers) if' they could also
get tt federal court injunction to bar a breach of their collective bargaining agreements,"
id. at 214, but he felt that any change in the law "is one of legislative policy properly
within the exclusive domain of Congress—it is a question for lawmakers, not law inter-
preters." Id. at 215. Moreover, Justice Black noted that Congress had opted to make
violations of the collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice enjoin able on
the instance of the NLRB. Id. at 206-07. However, Mr. Justice Black failed to point out
that this proposal was deleted from the final version of the I.MRA of 1947; instead the
Conference Report stated that the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements
should be left to the "usual processes of the law arid not to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board." H. R. REP. No 510, 80111 Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEctst.Ami: HISTORY or THE LABOR MANACEMENT RELATIONS AGT, 1947, at 546 (1948).
ar 370 U.S. at 215.
" Id. at 218, 225.
43 1d. at 217-18. The Supreme Court had previously "accommodated" § 4 when
the anti-injunction provisions conflicted with the policies of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive firemen & En-
ginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1949): Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515,
562-63 (1937). In Chicago River, the Court held that federal courts, notwithstanding
Norris-LaGuardia, may enjoin strikes over disputes as to the interpretation of an exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement, 353 U.S. at 31-32, 40, since such strikes flout the
duty imposed on the union by the Railway Labor Act to settle "minor disputes" by
submission to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, rather than by resorting to
economic pressure. Id. at 40.
44 370 U.S. at 216-18, 225. Mr. justice Brennan answered the majority's argu-
ment that since Congress had decided not to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act the
Court should be bound by their legislative intent. He stated: "[Congressional rejection
of outright repeal certainly does not imply hostility to an attempt by the courts to ac-
commodate all statutes pertinent to the decision of cases before them." Id, at 220.
" 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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tunity to reconsider its Sinclair decision." In Boys Markets, a union in-
volved in a dispute with the employer 47 chose to strike instead of
submitting the grievance to arbitration as mandated by the collective
bargaining agreement. The employer originally brought suit in the
California Superior Court and was granted a temporary restraining
order. The union then removed the case to federal district court and
sought to quash the state court injunction. The district court found
that the union was striking over an arbitrable grievance. Therefore,
the court enjoined the strike and ordered the union to arbitrate the
issue." The Court of Appeals, considering itself bound by Sinclair,
reversed. 49
 The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, 5° and held that where the union breaches a col-
lective bargaining agreement by striking over an arbitrable grievance,
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be "accommodated"
with section 301 of the LMRA so as to allow an injunction to issue."
The Court justified the accommodation of section 4 and the reversal
of Sinclair on two grounds. First, the Court noted "the importance
that Congress has attached generally to the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes without resort to self-help and more particularly to ar-
46
 For extensive criticism and commentary urging reconsideration of the Sinclair
decision, see generally, Report of Special Atkinson—Sinclair Committee, A.B.A. Labor Relations
Law Section-Proceedings 226 (1963); Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some
Unanswered Questions, 63 Cot.um, L. REv. 1027 (1963); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reap-
praised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rt:v. 292 (1963); Bartosic, Injunctions and Section .301: The Patch-
work if Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 Con's+. L.
REV. 980 (1969); Danau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 927 (1969);
Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco
and Beyond, 15 VIII. L. REA', 32 (1969); Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches
of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 303 (1968); Wellington, The
No-Strike Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-examination, 30 U. Pm. L. REV.
293 (1968); Wellington and Albert, Statutory Interpretation and The Political Process: A
Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L. J. 1547 (1963).
" Id. at 238-39. The dispute in Boys Markets arose when a supervisor began to
rearrange the merchandise in the frozen foods cases. A union representative insisted
that the restocking be done by union personnel. When the company refused, the union
struck. Id. at 239.
4" Id. at 240.
49
 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 916 F.2d 368, 370, 72 L.R.R.M.
2527, '2528 (9th Cir. 1969).
5° 398 U.S. at 255.
Sr 398 U.S. at 254, citing the dissent in Sinclair. Mr. Justice Black dissented essen-
tially restating his majority opinion in Sinclair. Id. at 255. See discussion of Sinclair at
notes 34-44 supra. He believed that if Sinclair was to be overruled, then Congress, and
not the Court, should do so. id. at 256. The Court advanced no cogent argument rebut-
ting Mr. Justice Black's contention in Sinclair, that legislative history showed that Con-
gress had considered, and rejected, the possibility of allowing injunctions for breaches
of the collective bargaining agreement. In his Boys Markets dissent, Mr. Justice Black
further argued that in the intervening years between Sinclair and Boys Markets, Congress
had been urged to legislatively overrule the Sinclair decision, but did not. From this he
concluded that the Court should accept this lack of action as an approval of the Sinclair
decision. Id. at 256. The majority countered that argument by merely stating; lilt is at
best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule
of law." Id. at 241.
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bitration as a means to this end." 51 The Court then reasoned that
Sinclair frustrated this policy since the employer's incentive to include
the arbitration clause as the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause was
necessarily dissipated if the no-strike clause could not be specifically
enforced. 53 Moreover, it was noted that under Sinclair, the arbitral
process itself was obviated," in that if the union's strike over an ar-
bitral grievance could not be enjoined, 55 then the employer would be
forced to forego the arbitration process altogether, and to concede the
disputed issue to the union.56
The Court offered as its second reason for reversing Sinclair the
conclusion that Sinclair in conjunction with Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
735, 57
 had effectively displaced the jurisdiction of state courts to issue
injunctions enforcing collective bargaining agreements:" While
52 Id. at '252. For previous judicial recognition of the congressional policy favor-
ing atd)itration see generally Local 174, Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962): Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). For a
discussion of the "presumption of arbitrability" see note 67 infra.
53 398 U.S. at 248.
54 Id. at 252.
" The majority recognized that the employer had other avenues available to re-
dress a breach of the no-strike clause, however they considered these remedies distruc-
Live to harmonious Labor-Management relations. Id. at 248. On the issue of the effec-
tiveness of alternate remedies, the Court adopted the position of the neutral members
of the A.B.A. Sinclair Committee.
Under existing laws, employers may maintain an action for damages re-
sulting from a strike in breach of contract and may discipline the em-
ployees involved. In many cases, however, neither of these alternatives will
be feasible. Discharge of' the strikers is often inexpedient because of a lack
of qualified replacements or because of the adverse effect on relationships
within the plant. The damage remedy may also be unsatisfactory because
the employer's losses are often hard to calculate and because the employer
may hesitate to exacerbate relations with the union by bringing a damage
action. Hence, injunctive relief will often be the only effective means by
which to remedy the breach of the no-strike pledge and thus effectuate
federal labor policy.
Id, at 248 -49 n.17, quoting from Report of Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee, A.B.A. Labor
Relation, Low Section Proceedings 226, 242 (1963) (footnotes omitted),
5" Sec 398 U.S. at 248-49. In explaining how a strike over an arbitral grievance
obviates the congressional policy favoring arbitration, one judge has stated:
["The union's actions made it clear that they did not intend to return to
work until the Company conceded that the tasks involved had to be per-
formed by union men.
Clearly, this strike had the effect of undermining the rule of law
that favors the arbitration of labor disputes, since the strike was an attempt
to force a union victory on the very issue that was made arbitrable not
through the presentation of reasoned arguments to a neutral arbitrator,
but rather through the use of sheer economic force. If the tactic had been
successful, it would have settled the arbitrable dispute, making arbitration
superfluous and thereby defeating the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
NAPA Pittsburg, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 323, 87
L.R.R.M. 2044, 2047 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049
(1974).
" 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
6" In Avco, the Tennessee state court granted an ex parte injunction against a
strike in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The union sought removal of
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Sinclair made it clear that an employer seeking to enjoin a breach of
the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause could not be
helped by the federal courts, Avco's holding allowing removal of suits
involving labor contract violations from state court to federal court ef-
fectively precluded the only avenue of relief available to the
employer—suit for injunctive relief in the state court. Once such a
suit was removed to federal court under Avco, Sinclair controlled and
no injunctive relief was available." The Boys Markets Court held that
this result was unacceptable for two reasons. First, this result was
found to be inconsistent with the purpose of section 301, which was
to supplement, not diminish, state court jurisdiction." Second, it was
feared that this situation would inevitably lead to forum shopping and
uneven enforcement of arbitration agreements."'
Implying from the policy of section 301 that injunctive relief was
available, the Court then delineated the substantive prerequisites re-
quired before a Boys Markets injunction could issue.
... When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over
a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to
arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order
until it first holds that the contract does have that effect;
and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a con-
the case to the federal district court claiming that * 301 gave the court the necessary
original jurisdiction over the dispute before removal can occur. The federal district
court, after granting removal, also granted dissolution ()I' the state court injunction. Id.
at 558-59.
The removal was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441 which provides in part:
.. any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the de-
fendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
it might be logically argued that the district court in Ayr() did not have original jurisdic-
tion over a suit brought under § 301 and therefore the case should not have been re-
moved. The reasoning would be that if the Norris-LaGuardia Act states that Inlo court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction" to issue an injunction, then the federal dis-
trict court lacks the requisite "original jurisdiction" required by the removal statute. In
Avco however, the Supreme Court did not accept thiS argument. "The nature of the re-
lief available after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question
whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy." 390 U.S. at 561.
" 398 U.S. at 244. The majority in Boys Markets considered remedying this
anomaly by adopting the alternative proposed by some commentators: to extend the
Sinclair decision to the states as well as -
 the federal courts. Id. at 247. The Court rejected
this alternative for two reasons. First, Congress did not intend to deprive state courts of
the power to grant injunctive relief when enforcing collective bargaining agreements
either in the Norris-LaGuardia Act or § 301. Id., accepting the reasoning of McCarron v.
Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. al 45, 315 P. 2d 322 (1957).
The second reason "for not resolving the existing dilemma by extending Sinclair to the
States [was] the devastating implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements
...." 398 U.S. at 247.
"Id. at 245-46. See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962),
where the Court reached the same conclusion that the congressional purpose of * 301
was to supplement and not to encroach on state court jurisdiction. Id. at 511.
61
 398 U.S. at 245-46.
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dition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike.
Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider
whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted
under ordinary principles of equity...."
Boys Markets was, then, the culmination of a long history of judi-
cial interpretation of section 301 from what objectively might have
been characterized as a mere procedural grant of jurisdiction to a
substantive vehicle for implementing the often conflicting aims of
labor statutes. The Court in Boys Markets had thus authorized a nar-
row exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the circumstance where
a union strikes over a grievance that it had agreed to arbitrate. It
thereby cemented into the developing labor law, in as bold a manner
of judicial interpretation of section 301 as hitherto seen, the canon of
statutory construction that when the aims of two statutes in the pat-
tern of labor enactments are apparently conflicting, some attempt
should be made to reconcile the conflict by looking to the underlying
policies supporting the respective enactments.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN BUFFALO FORGE
The federal courts encountered little difficulty in applying the
Boys Markets standard where a union responded to a grievance by strik-
ing rather than by submitting the grievance to arbitration as mandated
by the collective bargaining agreement." Within three years after the
Boys Markets decision, however, the circuit courts were in conflict over
the question of whether an injunction could issue to enjoin a sympathy
strike where the collective bargaining agreement contained both a
no-strike clause and a mandatory arbitration procedure. The Third,"
63 1d. at 254, quoted from Sinclair Relining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228
(1962) (emphasis in original). For the delineation of the ordinary principals of equity
required in Boys Markets see note 141 infra, and see generally WRIGHT & MILLER,
FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (1973).
63 See generally, Axelrod, .supra note 22, for a discussion of the application of the
Boys Markrtx standards.
Island Creek Coat Co. v. United Mine Workers Local 898, 507 F.2d 650, 653,
88 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2360 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (Court implied a no-
strike clause where mandatory arbitration procedure was present and then issued in-
junction); NAPA Pittsburg, inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
322, 324, 87 L.R.R.M. '2044, 2045-46 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049
(1974) (Union withheld the right to honor the picket lines of "primary" labor disputes;
injunction issued since it was arbitrable whether the initial strike was primary or secon-
dary).
The court in NAP/1 stated that "Irlequiring arbitration does not nullify the
union's right to honor a primary picket line, but only suspends the exercise of the right
until its existence is established by an arbitrator's decision." Id. at 324, 87 L.R.R.M. at
2046. Clearly this assumption is erroneous, since it has been recognized that strikes are
dependent on timing for their success and are not easily reestablished once broken. See
Danau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. Rev. 427, 466-67 (1969).
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Fourth," and Eighth" Circuits held that an injunction could issue
in a sympathy strike situation. These courts generally reasoned
that the presence of a mandatory arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement raised a presumption that any dispute was ar-
bitrable unless it could be said with "positive assurance" that the dis-
pute was not covered by the arbitration clause. 67 Since interpretations
of the labor contract are generally left to the arbitrator, the scope of
the no-strike clause was an arbitrable dispute and, as such, a Boys
Markets injunction could then issue to enjoin the strike. The Second, 68
Fifth, 69 and Sixth 7° Circuits, on the other hand, held that no injunc-
" Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132, 87 L.R.R.M.
2974, 2976 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (Injunction issued on an
implied no-strike clause); Willmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1426, 86
L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (Union reserved the
right to honor "bona fide" picket lines, and employer contested whether picket line was
bona fide thereby creating an arbitrable issue; injunction issued); Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 391, 497 F.2d 311, 312, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337,
2337 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (Contract gave individual union mem-
bers the right to refuse to cross a primary picket line, court vacated injunction against
individual members but allowed an injunction against the union); Monongahela Power
Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213-14, 84 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir.
1973) (issue of whether sympathetic strike is a violation of the contract is "clearly" ar-
bitrable; injunction issued).
° 6 Associated General Contractors v. International Union of Operating Engineers
Local 49, 519 F.2d 269, 273,89 L.R.R.M. 3077, 3080 (8th Cir. 1975) (Held that a pre-
liminary injunction was properly issued against a sympathy strike, where the contract
"afforded individual employees the right to honor a union picket line"; the Eighth Cir-
cuit had the benefit of an arbitrator's decision holding that the employees' actions were
individual action and not concerted union activity but since it was an arbitrable issue the
injunction was properly issued); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers, Local 425, 519
F.2d 263, 268, 89 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3077 (8th Cir. 1975) vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct.
3215 (1976) (Allowed issuance of injunction against sympathy strike where union had
reserved the right of "employees to refuse to pass through a picket line authorized by
the union"; a curious twist to this case is that the company originally demanded arbitra-
tion and then refused to go forward with arbitration after the strike was enjoined,
claiming that the district judge had "already decided" the issue).
67 The "presumption of arbitrability" is supported by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Its genesis
can be traced to the following statement: "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage." 363 U.S. at 582-83. A more recent post-Bop
Markets decision supporting the "presumption" in safety disputes is Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 379 (1974). The problem with applying this pre-
sumption in a sympathy strike situation is that it enjoins possibly legal strike activity. See
text at notes 135-40 infra.
68 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211, 89 L.R.R.M.
2303, 2306 (2d Cir. 1975), affd 96 S.Ct..3141 (1976) (See text at notes 11-13 supra).
61' Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373-74, 81
L.R.R.M. 2644, 2645-46 (5th Cir. 1972) (Strike was not "over" a grievance which the
parties were contractually bound to arbitrate and, therefore, a Boys Markets injunction
could not issue).
7° Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union Local 53, 520
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tion could issue in a sympathy strike situation. 7 ' These courts" gener-
ally reiterated the language of the Boys Markets holding that the strike
is enjoinable only if it is over a grievance which both parties are con-
tractually bound to arbitrate...." 73 In that a sympathy strike is not a
response to a dispute with the employer, but rather is a work stop-
page in deference to another union's picket line, this activity falls out-
side the rule of Boys Markets."
In Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court eliminated continued con-
fusion over the issue of the enjoinability of sympathy strikes by adopt-
ing the Second Circuit's approach. The Court distinguished Boys Mar-
kets by pointing out that in that case, the union had chosen to strike
instead of arbitrating—a direct violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. According to the Court, injunctive relief was necessary in
order to effectuate "the strong congressional preference for the pri-
vate dispute settlement mechanisms agreed upon by the parties." 75 In
F.2d 1220, 1221-22, 90 L.R.R.M. 2110, 21 10 (6th Cir. 1075) (Tillie narrowly cir-
cumscribed injunctive relief authorized in Boys Markets did not extend to the prohibition
of work stoppages generated by lawful labor disputes ...."; no injunction may issue).
Ti The Seventh Circuit has not 1M-initiated a clear sympathy strike policy. It orig-
inally sustained an ex parte temporary restraining order in a sympathy strike stating that
the "exceptionally broad arbitration clause is itself' expansive enough to encompass the
present disputes." Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d '293,
298, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2736-37 (7th Cir. 1974), However in Hyster Co. v. Independent
Towing & Lifting Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89, 89 L.R.R.M. 2885 (7th Cir. 1975), the
Seventh Circuit distinguished Inland Steel on the grounds that the language of the arbit-
ration clause was not as encompassing as the clause in Inland Steel. The court also intro-
duced the additional requirement that in sympathy strike situations the waiver of the
right to honor picket lines must be "clear and unmistakable." Id. at 92, 89 L.R.R.M. at
2887. Accord, Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830,
2832 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
72 The best reasoned opinion arguing for denial of the injunction in a sympathy
strike situation is the dissent of judge Hunter in NAPA Pittsburgh, inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.) (en bane)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). Judge Hunter argued that the
raison delve for issuing an injunction in Boys Markets was to prevent the union from un-
dermining the arhitral process by forcing the employer to concede a dispute that should
be decided by arbitration. However, in a sympathy strike situation the union is not at-
tempting to defeat the arbitrator's jurisdiction; and therefore, the "narrow" exception
to the Norris-La Guardia Act should not apply. Id. at 325-27, 87 L.R.R.M. at '2047-49.
On the contrary, Judge Hunter argued that the denial of the injunction would support
arbitration since the employers "will have every reason to seek arbitration since they will
be able to end the work stoppage only by prevailing on the merits." Id. at 327, 87
L.R.R.M. at 2049.
"Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added).
74 These courts also emphasized the Supreme Court's characterization of the Boys
Markets decision as "narrow," id. at 253, and expressed fear that if an injunction could
issue where the strike is not over an arbitrable issue, then it would be "difficult to con-
ceive of any strike which could not be so enjoined." Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644, 2645 (5th Cir. 1972).
" 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3147. This policy is exemplified in 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) which
provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of' an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
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Buffalo Forge, however, the activity in question was a sympathy strike
the purpose of which was neither to force a concession from the em-
ployer nor to avoid the obligation to arbitrate. As such, there was no
need to accommodate the anti-injunction provisions of Norris to the
pro-arbitration provisions of section 301, since the congressional pref-
erence for arbitration as the method of settling disputes was not
jeopardized."
The allegation by the employer that the strike was in itself a vio-
lation of the no-strike clause was also distinguished from the Boys
Markets situation. In Boys Markets, the strike activity expressly violated
the collective bargaining agreement. In Buffalo Forge, the issue of
whether a violation had occurred was itself a question of contract in-
terpretation. As such, this question was properly left to the arbitration
process, and not to the courts." Because the issue of whether the
sympathy strike violated the no-strike clause was arbitrable, the district
court could have ordered the union to arbitrate the issue. However,
the district court could not have issued an injunction since "the Court
has never indicated that the courts may enjoin actual or threatened
contract violations despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act."'" It was feared
that if the district court could enjoin strikes simply because they are
alleged to be violations of the collective bargaining agreement, then
any breach of contract could be so enjoined. This result would not be
desirable since it would not only involve the courts in litigation that
properly belonged before an arbitrator, but it would also cut deeply
into the mandates of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 7 !` Similarly, the Court
concluded that "the ... agreement ... to arbitrate ... would be evis-
cerated if the courts for all practical purposes were to try and to decide
contractual disputes at the preliminary injunction stage."" As a final
note, the Court acknowledged that it had considered the alternative
proposed by the dissent—that an injunction pending arbitration
should issue against strikes that are in clear violation of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, they rejected this as a viable solu-
tion, noting that, as a practical matter, arbitrators might be unduly in-
fluenced by a judicial finding, however preliminary, of illegality of the
strike."'
The dissent argued that Boys Markets controlled this case. In its
view, the same reasons compelling accommodation in Boys Markets
were equally applicable to Buffalo Forge. 82 First, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was enacted to prevent "injunctions against strike activity in




7 " Id. at 3148-99.
Id. at 3149.
"'
82 Id. at 3150 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ing	 ."" Thus, neither injunctions enforcing an agreenient to arbi-
trate nor the enforceability of a union's promise not to strike was one
of "the central concerns of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ... . "84 There-
fore, according to the dissent, the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not
bar injunctions where those concerns are not implicated. Second, the
dissent pointed out that section 301's support for the collective bar-
gaining process would be applicable if the employer could show that
the arbitration agreement was the quid pro quo not only for a no-strike
clause, but also for a no-sympathy strike clause." Third, the dissent
noted that accommodation of section 4 to section '301 is supported by
precedent." Thus, the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not present an
"insuperable obstacle" to enforcement of a no-sympathy strike
promise." Fourth, the anomaly of displacing state court jurisdiction
that existed after the Sinclair decision would again present itself in
sympathy strike situations, since the union could remove section 301
suits from the state court to the Federal court, and then, relying on
Buffalo Forge, could request dissolution of any state court. injunction."
Finally, the dissent argued that although the sympathy strike did not
frustrate the arbitral process in the same way as did the strike in Boys
Markets, it did frustrate the equally important policy of motivating
employers to agree to arbitration clauses."
Recognizing the force of the majority's argument that the Boys
Markets decision was only justified as a means of preventing the union
from frustrating the arbitral process, the dissent analyzed the function
of that process. Submitting disputes to arbitration, the dissent stated,
is not an end in itself; it is a means of clarifying the rights of the par-
ties under the collective bargaining agreement and of providing a
mechanism for resolving any unforseen contingencies leading to labor
disputes." As such, if the parties agreed to be bound by the decision
of the arbitrator appointed to resolve such disputes, then an injunc-
tion should issue to enforce the arbitrator's decision;" otherwise, the
process would be specious in that it would clarify the rights of the
parties without allowing the winning party any means to realize his
victory. In sharp contrast to the situation where arbitration is utilized
as a means of providing for unforeseen contingencies is the situation
where the parties have foreseen an area of potential conflict and have
resolved it by incorporating a clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. If the sympathy strike situation could he foreseen and re-
solved in the contract by a clause explicitly prohibiting such strikes,
" Id. at 3151.
84 Id.
"Id. at 3152-53.
"Id. at 3153. See text at notes 96-101 ii!fto.




"I Id. at 3156,
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then, the dissent concluded, the district judge should have the power
to issue an injunction prior to an arbitrator's decision."'
In Buffalo Forge, then, the Supreme Court has definitively stated
that even where there is a clear violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes the federal judiciary
from issuing injunctions in sympathy strike situations. The proper
course of conduct for an employer faced with the above situation is to
submit the issue to arbitration and then, upon a finding of illegality,
to seek enforcement of the arbitrator's cease and desist order in the
federal courts. The dissent, on the other hand, would allow injunctive
relief in some situations, provided that there was convincing evidence
that the strike was clearly illegal and that the union had a chance to
vie for its interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. The
dissent however rather disappointingly refrained from deciding the
issue of whether under the Buffalo Forge facts—that is, under a gen-
eral no-strike clause—an injunction should issue.
III. THE PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATION AND THE SYMPATHY STRIKE
While it is clear that the dissent would, and the majority would
not, accommodate_ in Buffalo Forge, neither opinion is wholly satisfac-
tory. The majority analyzed Buffalo Forge solely in terms of the ac-
commodation that took place in Boys Markets. Therefore, the Court
may have focused too narrowly on the historical roots of the process
of accommodation. The dissent, likewise focusing on Boys Markets, ig-
nored important distinguishing factors that make the attempt to de-
cide Buffalo Forge on the principles enunciated in Boys Markets hazard-
ous. It is submitted that the accommodation process is better facili-
tated by analyzing the sympathy strike situation as one which necessi-
tates a distinct and original policy balance rather than by determining
that a possible accommodation must stand or fall within the balance
struck by Boys Markets.
In developing a unique accommodation for sympathy strike situ-
ations, important distinctions between the fact situations of Boys
Markets and Buffalo Forge must be considered. In Boys Markets, once
the principle of accommodation was recognized as an appropriate jud-
icial function," 3
 the balance was straightforward; the Norris-
LaGuardia Act would not apply whenever a strike frustrated the con-
gressional preference for arbitration as the voluntary mechanism for
settling industrial disputes. However, the Buffalo Forge situation has
" 2
 Id. at 3158-59. It is important to point out that the dissent did not argue for
issuance of an injunction in the Bollido Forge case; in fact, the dissent carefully left this
question open. Id. at 3159. The dissent merely argued that the injunctive power should
be available to the district judge if certain other contingencies are present. Id.
"Note that Mr. justice Black in dissent in Bays Morkels found this to be a legisla-
tive and not a judicial function. 398 U.S. at 257-58. For a further discussion of Mr. Jus-




distinguishing factors that make the accommodation determination
more complex. First, most accommodations have hitherto been based
on the congressional preference for arbitration," 4 whereas in the spit.-
pathy strike situation it is at least ambiguous whether an accommoda-
tion would support this preference. Second, in Boys Markets, it was
readily apparent that there was a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, whereas it is not usually clear that a sympathy strike is a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement's no-strike clause." 5
An accommodation which best reflects the issues at stake in a
sympathy strike situation may be attained only if two distinct questions
are answered. First, is the congressional preference for arbitration the
only basis for accommodating the Norris-LaGuardia Act? In answer-
ing this question the following factors must be considered: the Court's
previous accommodations, and the congressional policies furthered by
accommodating in a sympathy strike situation. Secondly, if it is ap-
propriate to accommodate in a sympathy strike situation, what are the
limitations of such an accommodation? This question focuses on the
determination of whether the sympathy strike is a violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement's no-strike clause.
A. Arbitration as the Basis fir Accommodation
There are at least four distinct, fact situations in which the scope
of accommodation was limited to the congressional preference for ar-
bitration. First, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Indiana Railroad,"" the Court authorized injunctive relief against a
strike, when such a remedy was necessary to effectuate the duty im-
posed by the Railway Labor Act to arbitrate "minor" disputes. Second,
in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills," the Court held that. a district
court could order specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate
where one of the parties refused to submit a disptite to the collective
bargaining agreement's arbitration procedures. Third, in Boys Markets,
the Court held that an injunction could issue to enjoin a strike which
was in clear. breach of an arbitration agreement." Lastly, in New Or-
leans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418," the
"I See text al notes 96-101 infra.
"' See text at notes 135-40 infra.
"" 353 U.S. 30, 40-42 (1957).
" 7 353 U.S. 448, 457-59 (1957),
" 8 398 U.S. at 248.
"" 389 F.2d 369, 371-72, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430, 2432-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 828 (1968). Accord, General Dynamics Corp. v. Local 5, Industrial Union of Marine
& Ship Building Workers, 469 F.2t1 848, 851, 81 L.R.R.M. 2746, 2748 (1st Cir. 1972);
Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 454
F.2d 262, 263-64, 79 L.R.R.M. 2116, 2116.17 (9th Cir. 1971). lint see, Tanker Service
Comm,. Inc. v. International Organization of Masters Mates & Pilots, 269 F. Supp. 551,
552, 65 L.R.R.M. 2848, 2849 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The Supreme Court in BrrJJrrfo Forge im-
plicitly recognized the soundness of this accommodation by staring that "were the issue
arbitrated and the strike found illegal, the relevant federal statutes as construed in our
cases would permit an injunction to enforce the arbitral decision." 96 S. Ct. at 3146. The
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Fifth Circuit held that an injunction could issue to enforce an
arbitrator's cease and desist order. Thus there exists ample authority
for accommodating the Norris-LaGuardia Act in service to arbitration.
The Court in Buffalo Forge, apparently relying heavily on this
precedent, limited the scope of accommodation by reading the Boys
Markets decision as supporting the proposition that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should be accommodated only when the strike would
frustrate the arbitral process. Given that limited scope, the Court ac-
curately concluded that accommodation in the Buffalo Forge situation
was not appropriate since it did not support the arbitration process.
The union in a sympathy strike situation is not trying to avoid arbitra-
tion as a means of settling a dispute,'°" but rather is lending support
to a sister union's strike by refusing to cross their picket line. As such
the strike itself does not frustrate the arbitral process in the Boys Mar-
kets context, since the union does not seek to avoid the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator by forcing a concession from the employer."'
While the Court's conclusion in Buffalo Forge seemingly followed
from its enunciated premise, the Court may have focused too nar-
rowly on the process of accommodation by limiting the scope of ac-
commodation exclusively to the congressional preference for arbi-
tration. Although it is true that accommodation has consistently been
utilized to support this congressional preference, there has never been
a pronouncement by the Court that the accommodation process is lim-
ited solely to this policy. Both in definition and application the Court
has given the accommodation process a broader scope. Justice Bren-
nan has characterized the purpose of the process by broadly stating:
The Court has long acted upon the premise that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not stand in isolation. It is one
of several statutes which, taken together, shape the national
labor policy. Accordingly, the Court has recognized that
Norris-LaGuardia does not invariably bar injunctive relief
when necessary to achieve an important objective of some
other statute in the pattern of labor laws.' 02
Indeed, relying on this broader conception the Court has utilized the
accommodation process to support congressional objectives other than
the furtherance of arbitration. Two of these situations are illustrative.
In Virginia Railway v. System Federation No. 40, 103 the employer
Court cited United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960),
as precedent for the proposition that an injunction can issue to enforce an arbitration
award; however, that case merely held that the district court could order an employer
to comply with an arbitrator's award of damages. IS. at 599. The Court in Buffalo Forge
has significantly extended the holding of that case by allowing an injunction- to issue
against a strike once the arbitrator has declared the strike illegal.
101' Buffalo Forge, 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
101 See note 56 supra.
102 Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 217 (dissenting opinion).
'" 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
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railroad refused to recognize a union which had been certified pur-
suant to the Railway Labor Act.'" to represent the employees in their
negotiations.'" The union sued for a mandatory injunction forcing
the railroad to negotiate as was required by section 2, Ninth of the
Railway Labor Act.'"" The Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
would not. bar such an injunction since the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act "cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more
general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."'" Hence, the Court
accommodated the Norris-LaGuardia Act to give effect to the Railway
Labor Act's policy of exclusive employee representation by mandating
that the employer negotiate with the:certified union.
More recently, in Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United
Transportation Union, 1 " 8 negotiations between the employer and the
union over work rules had broken down and the union threatened to
strike.'" When the employer sought an injunction against the
threatened strike, the union defended by claiming that. section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Forbade the issuance of an injunction in this
situation. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the union's defense, held
that "strike injunctions may issue when such a remedy is the only
practical, effective means of enforcing the duty to exert reasonable ef-
fort to make and maintain agreements ...."'" The Court reasoned
that it had "no choice but to trace out as best we may the uncertain
line of appropriate accommodation of two statutes with purposes that
lead in opposing directions. "III This accommodation is certainly
broader than even the Boys Markets accommodation, since it enjoins
strikes even where the union has not agreed to a no-strike clause.
Furthermore, the accommodation iS riot limited to strikes over arbitr-
able grievances, as was Boys Markets, but rather, extends to strikes that
subvert the collective bargaining process in general.' 12
1 " 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et my]. (1970).
1 " 300 U.S. at 538.
""415 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970). Section 152, Ninth, provides in pertinent part:
If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are
the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accor-
dance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the
Mediation BOard, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investi-
gate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty
days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the m ane or.names
of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and au-
thorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify
the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall
treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft
or class fur the purposes or this chapter.
"1
 300 U.S. at 563.
"" 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
"5 /d. at 571.
15 Id. at 583.
112 hi. at 582. There was, however, a disclaimer in the decision that if the Court
had misinterpreted the ct then Congress should act to rectify this misinterpretation. id.
" 2 These cases may be distinguished by the fact. that they involved direct statu-
tory duties (Railway Labor Act), as opposed to contractual duties (Buffalo huge) but as
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Noting that the process of accommodation can be, and has been,
broadly conceived to support congressional labor policies other than
arbitration, it is submitted that there is a panoply of important labor
policies that support an accommodation in a sympathy strike situation.
Examples of such federal labor goals include providing employer in-
centive to consent to arbitration clauses; 13 supplementing rather than
displacing state court jurisdiction;" 4 and encouraging voluntary
agreement to maintain the industrial peace." 5
In focusing so narrowly on the Boys Markets concern with the
frustration of the arbitral process, the Court failed to acknowledge the
possible dissipation of any incentive the employer might have to enter
into arbitration agreements in return for a no-strike clause, where
that agreement. can not be specifically enforced by an injunction." 5
Applying this concern to the sympathy strike situation, it is likely that
the employer may be less inclined to grant the arbitration clause if he
is not sure that it will prevent strikes generally—and sympathy strikes
specifically. In fact, the Supreme Court in its Buffalo Forge decision
has implicitly held that even if the employer extracts an explicit no-
sympathy strike clause as the quid pro quo for his concession of an arbitra-
tion clause, it is not enforceable by injunction.' " Thus, although the
sympathy strike does not frustrate the arbitral process, it could well
frustrate the motivation of an employer to agree initially to the arbit-
ration clause.
The anomaly of displacing state court jurisdiction which resulted
from a refusal to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section
301 in Sinclair, could be reestablished "8 by a finlure to accommodate
in a sympathy strike situation. Employers, faced with sympathy strikes
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement but realizing that
temporary relief is not available in the federal courts, will surely seek
Mr. Justice Brennan stated, there is one factor that made accommodation more favor-
able in the Sinclair case than in the Railway cases, that is the express contractual com-
mitment of the union to refrain from striking, viewed in light of the overriding pur-
pose of section 301 to assist the enforcement of collective agreements." 370 U.S. at 219.
See also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia
Act's procedural protection of a jury trial in cases of criminal contempt to permit sum-
mary contempt in order us buttress the enforcement power of an NLRA injunction);
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949)
(accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia Act to support policy of non-discrimination).
"3 See, e.g., Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248.
I " See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507, 511 (1962).
" 5 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
453-54 (1957).
"° Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248.
" 1 See 96 S. Ct. at 3148. The Court made it clear that Boys Markets had not au-
thoriz.ed the district courts to issue injunctions against strikes merely because those
strikes were actual violations of the labor contract. The Court read Bop Markets to au-
thorize injunctions against strikes that not only violated the labor contract but also frus-
trated the congressional preference for arbitration. Id. at 3147-48. Thus, since sym-
pathy strikes do nut frustrate that congressional objective, they will never he enjoinable
merely because they are violations of an express no-sympathy strike clause.
"" Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 244-46.
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such relief in the state courts.'" The union, however, may then at-
tempt to remove the action to federal courts to prevent injunctive
relief."" In that case, the same policies that were frustrated after
Sinclair, such as, elimination of forum shopping, maintenance of state
court jurisdiction, 30 l's grant of additional employer remedies and
uniform administration of collective bargaining agreements, will be
frustrated after 13 uffido Forge. 1 21
The third labor policy that can be Gictored into the process of
accommodating in the sympathy strike situation is the congressional
policy favoring maintenance of the industrial peace' 22 through the use
of the collective bargaining process. 123 In general, labor legislation in
u" The state courts are not hound by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Boys Markets
expressly refused to so extend it. 398 U.S. at 247-48. In 1969, when the anomaly of
displacing stale court. jurisdiction emerged, a vast majority of the state courts had,
likewise, held that the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act does not affect their right to issue
injunctions against strikes that are breaches of collective bargaining agreements. In fact,
seven states that enacted state acts similar to Norris-LaGuardia held that even these
slate acts do not bar issuance of an injunction under such circumstances. Indeed, only
one state, New jersey, has refused to issue an injunction against a strike in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement basing its holding, though, on the state anti-
injunction statute. See cases and statutes cited in Bartosic, note 46 supra, at 1001-06,
notes 135-36. Thus, it seems clear that employers in attempting to obtain injunctions
against sympathy strikes in violation of the collective bargaining agreement will find a
receptive forum in the state courts.
" 0 Courts have held that when a federal injunction could not have issued tinder
Boys Markets, the state court injunction must be dissolved, since failing to do so would
he tantamount to issuing an injunction. Pullman, Inc, v. International Bhd. of Boiler-
makers, 354 F. Stipp. 496, 498-99, 82 L.R.R.M. 2638, 2640 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also
General Electric Co. v. Local 191, Intl Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers,
413 F,2d 964, 966, 71 L.R,R.M. 2903, 2904 (5th Cir. 1969), votated on other grounds, 398
U.S. 436 (1970).
'" Buffalo Jorge, 96 S. Ct. at 3154-55 (dissenting opinion). See text and notes at
notes 57-61 supra. for a more complete discussion of this problem.
'" It should be noted that the concern of Boys Markets was not the deification of
the arbitration process as the end result, but rather was the degree to which arbitration
promoted the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. "(Wle have frequently noted ,
the importance that Congress has attached generally to the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes without resort to self help and more particularly to arbitration as a means to
this end." 398 U.S, at 252 (emphasis added).
"3
 It was originally the goal of Congress to promote industrial peace through
elimination of employer interference with organization and representation. Section 1 of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), provides:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other Forms of industrial strife or unrest,
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the in-
strumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce: (c)
materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce,
or the prices of such material or goods in commerce; or (d) causing dim-
inution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to im-
pair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of
commerce.
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the United States does not attempt to control the results of collective
bargaining negotiations by dictating the terms and conditions of
employment. 124 Rather, these terms and conditions are ultimately left
to the parties in the industrial relationship to resolve through the col-
lective bargaining process. 125 Similarly, labor legislation does not
mandate that the parties agree to maintain the industrial peace; in-
deed, section 13 of the NLRA explicitly recognizes that the Act does
not affect the fundamental right of employees to participate in con-
certed activity. 126 However, the Act does recognize that "sound and
stable industrial peace ... and ... the best interests of employers and
employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of is-
sues between employers and employees through the processes of con-
ference and collective bargaining between employers and the rep-
resentatives of their employees." 127 Thus the Act evinces a policy
favoring the collective bargaining process as an "effective instrument
[for] stabilizing labor relations and preventing ... strikes and indus-
trial strife."' 28
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of' contract, and em-
ployers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by pre-
venting the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions
within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from in-
jury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by en-
couraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees.
In 1947, Congress evidencing its concern over union abuse of their newfound power,
added the following paragraph to the 1935 Declaration of Policy of the National Labor
Relations Act, thereby making the policy of avoidance of industrial strife two-sided:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some
labor organizations, !heir officers, and members have the intent or the
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the
free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other forms of
industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair the interest
of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of' such
practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein
guaranteed.
121 H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents WI Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488, 490 (1960). Sep, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970)
(the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a pro-
posal or require the making of a concession").
122 ELK. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
126 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
'" 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1970).
12" H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 524 (1941). See also Carey v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964).
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Industrial peace is secured through the collective bargaining
process by first, using the bargaining table as a forum where the par-
ties can "promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by
subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence
of negotiation;"' 29 second, the parties can agree to utilize arbitration
machinery to resolve unforseen disputes that might arise in the fu-
ture; and third, the parties can, through the give and take of negotia-
tions, resolve ongoing disputes and embody that resolution in the
labor contract.'" The LM RA, recognizing that industrial peace is thus
secured, provides certain mechanisms that are designed to promote
these phases of collective bargaining. First, it requires the parties "to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith."'" Second, it
makes available "full and adequate governmental facilities for concilia-
tion, mediation, and voluntary arbitration."'" Finally, the LMRA, in
section 301, allows suits for breach of the labor agreement to be
brought in the federal courts.' 33
The application of this policy objective to sympathy strike situa-
tions is obvious. There is no per .ve requirement that a union refrain
from participating in sympathy strikes; indeed, if the union chooses to
retain its statutory right to so participate, it may. But on the other
hand, if the union voluntarily gives up the right to participate in sym-
pathy strikes, then the federal policy favoring voluntary agreements to
maintain the industrial peace should operate to bind them to their
agreement.
Thus, there exist clear congressional labor policies that would be
12 " Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
"" H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
'a' 29 U.S.C. § I58(d) (1970).
"" 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1970). See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 456 (1957),
1 " 29 U.S.C. § I85(a) (1970). See generally Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50,
American Bakery & Confectionary Workers Inel, 570 U.S. 254, 263 (1962). See note 4
supra fur text of § 301(a). The Senate Report on § 301(a) stated:
If unions can break agreements. with relative impunity, then such
agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution of
an agreement does not by itself promote industrial peace. The chief ad-
vantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective labor
agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the
agreement. Without some effective method of assuring freedom from
economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little reason why
an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to pro-
mote industrial peace through faithful performance by the parties, collec-
tive agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable in the
Federal courts
Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding,
and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a
higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and
will thereby promote industrial peace.
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OE TIlE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act', 1947, at 422-23 (1948).
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furthered by reaching an accommodation in a situation in which the
union clearly agreed not to participate in sympathy strikes. As such, it
is possible to reanalyze the sympathy strike situation and arrive at an
analytically justifiable accommodation of section 301 and section 4. It
is submitted that such an accommodation in the Buffalo Forge situation
would support a panoply of important federal labor policies, includ-
ing the strong congressional preference for arbitration, uniformity of
labor law, and peaceful settlement of labor disputes. Therefore, an
accommodation under these circumstances would seem to fall within
the ambit of the Supreme Court's policy that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act "does not invariably bar injunctive relief when necessary to
achieve an important objective of some other statute in the pattern of
labor laws."' 34
B. Limitations on the Proposed Accommodation
The proposed accommodation assumes that the union has bar-
gained away its right to participate in sympathy strikes and that the
strike is therefore illegal. While in a Boys Markets situation there is no
doubt as to the strike's illegality prior to the issuing of an
injunction,'" 5
 in a typical sympathy strike situation the legality of the
strike is an issue. This issue arises because it is uncommon in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement for either the union to waive completely
the right to participate in sympathy strikes or for the employer to let
the union retain that right without some qualifications. 13 ' Accord-
ingly, there is usually a qualification in the collective bargaining
agreement that provides the union with the right to honor only
"primary," 137
 "authorized"' 38
 or "bona fide" 1 " picket lines. Thus,
"4 Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 217. Some commentators have persuasively argued that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not apply to situations involving breach of a collective
bargaining agreement since "fb1reach of a collective agreement, as such, is clearly not a
section 13 labor dispute. Nor is it section 4 conduct to which the anti-injunction stric-
tures attach." Gregory, 7'he Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635, 645
(1959). See Rice, Paradox of our National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REv. 233, 250 (1951);
Stewart, No -Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MECH. L. REv. 674, 683 (1961).
135 In a Boys Markets situation there is no doubt that the strike is illegal because
the union has agreed not to strike over an arbitrable dispute. When the union does
strike over an arbitrable dispute, it is in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The requirement in Bays Markets that the district court find that the agreement requires
the union to arbitrate the particular dispute over which the union struck adequately
protects unions from injunctions against legal strikes, since a strike over an arbitrable
grievance is illegal according to the collective bargaining agreement.
" See, eg., cases cited at notes 137-39 infra.
13 TNAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
322, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2045 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). For
a discussion of NAPA see note 64 supra.
"" Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 265 n.4, 89
L.R.R.M. 3073, 3074 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Valmac see note Wm/Jai.
Willmington Shipping, Go. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2896,




when such a provision in the collective bargaining agreement is at
issue, the illegality of the sympathy strike may not be clear, Conse-
quently, an accommodation in such a situation must adequately pro-
tect the union's right to engage in legal sympathy activity, yet at the
same time must recognize the problems of the employer who has bar-
gained for continued productivity but has no recourseH" when the
union participates in a strike that is an apparent. violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.
Recognizing the union's legitimate fear that the district court
might enjoin legitimate strike activity if' an injunction could issue
under the Boys Markets standards, the dissent. in Buffalo Forge pro-
posed two additional safeguards for a Buffalo Forge situation.'" First,
the dissent suggested that there should be no ex porte restraining or-
ders. Such a rule would give the union an opportunity to present evi-
dence as to the proper interpretation of the collective bargaining ag-
reement. Second, the dissent maintained that an injunction should not.
issue unless there is convincing evidence that the sympathy strike is
clearly within the no-strike clause.'" The first requirement—that
14 " The employer's recourse is limited by the fact that actions for damages and
attempts to discipline striking employees after a labor dispute only serve to exacerbate
industrial strife and delay early resolution of the difficulties between employer and
union. See note 55, supra.
"'The dissent would additionally require that. the traditional equitable require-
ments necessary lot injunctive relief be met. The equitable showings previously re-
quired in Boys Markets were the following: breaches are occurring and will continue, or
have been threatened and will be comnntted; irreparable injury to the employer must
exist; and the employer will suffer more from the denial of the injunction than the
union will suffer from its issuance. 398 U.S. at 254. The requirement of demonstrating
probable success on the merits was nut necessary in the typical Boys Markets situation;
the only necessary showing in Boys Markets was the probability that the dispute was ar-
bitrable. This requirement followed from the Steelworkers presumption of arbit•ability.
the dispute was arbitrable, the employer had already won on the merits; the merits
being that the strike was in violation of the contract. However, as previously rioted this
presumption would be impermissible in a sympathy strike situation since it could result
in enjoining legal strikes. It is therefore necessary to revive the equitable requirement
of probability of success on the merits as yet another safeguard against the enjoinability
of legal sympathy strikes. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2948 (1973).
'42 96 S. Ct. 3158-59.
[1n110 injunction or temporary restraining order should issue without first
giving the union an adequate opportunity to present evidence and argu-
ment, particularly upon the proper interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement; the judge should not issue an injunction without convinc-
ing evidence that the strike is clearly within the no-strike clause. Further-
more, to protect the efficacy of arbitration, any such injunction should re-
quire the parties to submit the issue immediately to the contractual griev-
ance procedure, and if the union so requests at the last stage and upon an
expedited schedule that assures a decision by the arbitrator as soon as
practicable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The dissent's formulation that the synipathy strike must be clearly within the no-
strike clause implicitly recognizes that the doctrine of waiver provides appropriate
safeguards to the employees. It has been recognized that employees may waive the right
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there should be no ex. parte injunctions—is more stringent than both
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the already strict
procedural requirements of section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
since both allow temporary restraining orders to be issued ex pante in
very limited circumstances.' 43 Stringent though it may be, it is sug-
gested that it is essential to give the union an opportunity to present
its interpretation of a no-strike clause, given the consequences that
flow from an improvidently granted injunction. The dissent's second
requirement can be viewed as encompassing two separate safeguards:
First, that there should be an initial presumption that the sympathy
strike is legal;' 44
 and second, that the employer must satisfy the bur-
den of proving illegality by convincing evidence.' 45
 While the second
safeguard is obvious from the language of the dissent's requirement,
the first safeguard follows from the fact that the dissent states the re-
quirement in terms of an injunction not issuing unless the strike is
to engage in sympathy activity in lieu of other benefits. NLRB v. Rockaway News Sup-
ply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79-81 (1953); see also Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742,
744, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213 (1974). However the waiver of a collective bargaining
right must he clear and unmistakable. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270,
283 (1956); NLRB v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d 393, 399, 76
L.R.R.M. 2576, 2581 (7th Cir. 1971); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
746, 751, 54 L.R.R.M. 2785, 2789 (6th Cir.), (Tn. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1963).
However, the dissent's result is not free from criticism. First it would require the
district court judge, at least preliminarily, to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement's no-strike clause, whereas this interpretation is usually left to the informed
judgment of the arbitrator. This usurpation of the arbitrators function would be incon-
sistent with the holding in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960). In that case the court stated that "the question of interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator, It is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns
construction of the contrct, the courts have no business overruling him because their in-
terpretation of the contract is different from his." id. at 599.
Secondly, there is the possibility that the arbitrator may give undue deference to
the district court's finding of illegality. As the majority in Brjfalo Forge stated: "It is in-
credible to believe that the courts would always view the facts and the contract as the
arbitrator would; and it is difficult to believe that the arbitrator would not be heavily in-
fluenced or wholly pre-empted by judicial views of the facts and the meaning of con-
tracts if this procedure is to be permitted." 96 S. Ct. at 3149.
"'See FED. R. Civ, PRO. 65(B) and 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
I"
 While the "presumption of the legality" of a sympathy strike may seem incon-
gruous to the "presumption of arbitrability" in the Steelworkers Trilogy, see note 67
.supra, this incongruity can be quickly dispelled. The presumption of arbitrability merely
forces the district court to submit the dispute to the arbitrator; while the presumption
of legality compels hesitation before the court enjoins the strike and sends it to the ar-
bitrator. It is conceivable, in fact probable, that the judge could refuse to issue an in-
junction since the legality of the strike is not "clear," while saving the ultimate resolu-
tion of the dispute for the arbitrator.
' 46 The requirement that the employer have the burden of proof before obtain-
ing an injunction is consistent with both Rule 65 of FED. R. Civ. PRO. and with the case
law interpreting that rule. For example, in Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423 (1974), the Supreme Court stated: "The
burden was on the employers to show that they were entitled to a preliminary injunc-
tion, not on the Union to show that they were not." Id. at 443.
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clearly within the no-strike clause. The presumption of legality re-
quirement is wholly appropriate in order to protect legal strikes from
injunctions since the burden of clear draftsmanship should fall on the
employer given the absolute provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Similarly, although only a preponderance standard is necessary in
suits filed under section 301, 14 " the requirement that the employer
prove illegality by convincing evidence also seems appropriate given
the possibility of ambiguous no-strike clauses. 147
conscientiously applied by the district courts, these stringent
safeguards should represent a significant obstacle to an employer
seeking to obtain injunctive relief in a sympathy strike situation. Ac-
cordingly, the proposed accommodation, buttressed by these
safeguards, could both provide an employer with the opportunity to
guard against sympathy strikes by unambiguously making that inten-
tion manifest in the collective bargaining agreement, and could pro-
tect legitimate union activity from injunctions.
CONCLUSION
While the refusal to accommodate in the Buffalo Forge decision
can be analyzed as consistent with the landmark accommodation in
Boys Markets, Inc, v. Retail Clerks Union, it remains possible to justify an
independent accommodation in a sympathy strike situation. It has
been noted that if the process of accommodation is "broadly" con-
ceived as a means of reconciling apparently inconsistent statutory
aims, rather than "narrowly" relegated to reconciling the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to the congressional preference for arbitration, then
an accommodation in a sympathy strike situation can. be  reached
which would support a panoply of congressional objectives while still
retaining the core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
KENNETH J. MALLOY
Constitutional Law—Due Process—the Interests in Reputation and
Employment—Paul v. Davis' and Bishop v. Wood 2 —In two recent
cases, the Supreme Court has had occasion to reconsider the extent to
146 See, e.g., Bartels v. Lithographers' & Photo-Engravers' Union No: One-P, 306
F. Supp. 1266, 1272, 73 L.R.R.M. 2154, 2158 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), altd per curium 431 F.2d
1205, 75 L.R.R.M. 2400 (2d Cir. 1970).
1° 'There is some support for a higher standard of proof in § 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act since it requires "clear proof" of participation or ratification or unlawful
acts before a member of a union can be held liable. See, e.g., Ramsey v. United Mine
Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 307-10 (1971),
' 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
2 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Both cases are noted in The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
Wow. L. REV. 56, 86-104 (1976).
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